Constantly Changing and Unstable Alliances

 

Zenith: Prof. Giorgis, you have been around in the Red Sea region for quite some time, you have political experience on both sides of on both shores of the Red Sea and advise the European Union on the Yemen conflict, in which function you also have met with Houthi leaders. Is the escalation of the Houthis against cargo ships in the Red Sea really a gesture of solidarity with the Palestinians in Gaza? Or what is their strategy and political calculus?

Andebrhan: I think their main strategy is to gain international recognition for a Houthi dominated government in Yemen; it seems to me their primary objective. Of course, the crisis at the Strait of Bab el Mandeb has turned them from a local actor into a regional actor with global ramifications. It has enhanced their status in the Arab street as they are seen as the only non-state or state actor that's actively expressing support and solidarity with the Palestinian cause. This has strengthened their role within the Axis of Resistance, portrayed as a strategic partnership between the various forces such as Hamas in Gaza, Hezbollah in Lebanon, the Islamic Resistance and Popular Resistance Forces in Iraq, Syria and Iran. So, I think they have gained in status within this framework as well. And as you very well know, the strategic importance of their ability to disrupt maritime traffic, shipping, international trade via a key shipping lane gives them, well, to put it quite mildly, considerable leverage regionally and internationally. 

In which way?

The Strait of Bab el Mandeb and the Suez Canal are among the world’s critical chokepoints. That’s why the crisis needs an internationally negotiated solution urgently. This also shows us that the Houthis consider that the Yemeni crisis and the war on Gaza and the occupation of Palestine are interlinked. A just resolution to the Palestine question would reduce regional tensions and help lead to a durable peace in the region. Conflict in the Red Sea is linked to this very significant regional issue and impacts global trade. It forces ships to go around the Cape of Good Hope instead of passing through the Red Sea, which is a much longer and much more expensive route. It also aggravates the state of instability and insecurity in an already highly volatile region. 

Many Western observers believe that the Houthis are merely executing the policies of Iran in the region, and that the linking of conflict in Gaza and in the Red Sea was even more evidence to this. The Houthis and Iran are allies, at the same time it looks like the Houthis pursue their own agenda and are sometimes even at odds with Tehran. What is your view on this?

I think the characterization of the Houthis as proxies of Iran does not reflect the reality or the underlying power dynamics. In my view, Hamas, Hezbollah and the other militant groups in the region have a strategic alliance or partnership with Iran. But each of them has their own agenda, their own local, national and regional agenda. To the extent that their aims and interests align with Iran’s agenda, they cooperate. If they don’t align, they don’t cooperate or take orders. They are prone to doing their own thing.

And do you think the Iranian policy has shifted because of their dealings with the Gulf states and their rapprochement with Saudi Arabia recently in the Bab el Mandab, or are they just using basically the Bab el Mandab to apply the same pressure that they would otherwise have used in the Strait of Hormuz?

What you have here is a complex conflict matrix with multiple layers. In this context, Iran has a vital interest in advancing the rapprochement with Saudi Arabia and with the other members of the Gulf Cooperation Council. So, you have this objective. On one hand, Iran has also posed as champion of the Palestinian cause. So, in that sense, their interests collide or coincide.

We see war and instability on both shores of the Red Sea, and the Horn of Africa. Namely, Sudan, Yemen, Ethiopia, Somalia to cite some examples. What is the link between these conflicts and what are the geopolitical implications?

If we look at the Red Sea, it's flanked by the Arabian Peninsula in the east and northeast Africa in the west and linked with the outside world through the Suez Canal to the Mediterranean and Europe in the north, and via the Strait of Bab el Mandeb with the Indian Ocean, the Gulf of Aden, the Arabian Sea, the Indian Ocean, and the Far East. It is also close to the oil-rich Gulf states and to the Nile Basin. These features lend the Red Sea great geostrategic importance. Internally, the region is marked by cultural, social, economic and political interconnection through migration and population movements. The historical mobility of people back and forth from both sides of the Red Sea has created very close ties. This should be an essential asset in peace building, in promoting stability, security and cooperation in the region. At the same time, if you look at it externally, the region hosts the military and naval bases of several great and middle powers.  

Which ones do you have in mind?

When I say great powers, I mean the US, China and, to an extent, India. The middle powers are Egypt, Iran, Saudi Arabia, Türkiye, United Arab Emirates. All these regional and global powers have diverse interests. These diverse interests are often at loggerheads with each other. I think the resulting power struggles operate to aggravate regional tensions, fuel interstate conflicts, and perpetuate internecine wars. Most notably, we can see this happening in Ethiopia, Somalia, Sudan and Yemen. So, there is a linkage here where local, regional, national and international forces interact in pursuit of specific parochial interests in the context of a constantly shifting alignment of forces. There is no stable alliance if you look at it. And this is more uncertain and more unpredictable and therefore not amenable to long-term targeted intervention.

Would you say that, um, the same actors are like geopolitical actors who are involved in the Sudanese crisis and the Yemeni crisis? Or is there a fundamental difference in the quality of the international actors?

Of course they are. You have state and non-state actors involved the crisis in Sudan and in Yemen. I think we can all agree that the primary or root cause of the crisis is internal. Everywhere the conflicts are the outcome of decades of malgovernance, exclusionary politics and marginalization of groups in the periphery. The struggle for hegemony inflames the internal causes of the crisis, with the external powers supporting opposing sides in the conflict merely aggravates and perpetrates the crisis. It's not the cause of the crisis. It is an aggravator and a perpetrator of the crisis. By supporting opposing forces, enabling them, supplying them with the wherewithal to continue the fight in the ongoing wars.

If you mentioned the regional powers, you talk about Saudi Arabia, Egypt, the UAE, Iran, Turkey.

Most of them have military bases or presence in the region - in Djibouti and Somalia, as you know.

Which external actors mainly contributed to the aggravation of the crisis, in your view?

The UAE’s support for Prime Minister Abiy Ahmed’s ethno-religious sectarian regime in Ethiopia that has emerged as the key destabilizing force in the region is an important factor. This includes Ethiopia’s ambitions for access to the sea. In principle, any landlocked country has a legitimate right of access to the sea through a transit country. However, this right is not absolute. It must be negotiated and mutually agreed upon in accordance with the 1982 United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea. Of course, such an agreement should not, and cannot, be at the expense of the sovereignty, territorial integrity, or national interest of any transit state. 

What Ethiopia is demanding, and threatening to use force to attain its demand, is ownership of a coastline to build a naval base. Which means a violation of the territorial integrity of any transit country concerned, and a violation of international law. Now let us look at the 1982 UN Convention on the Law of the Sea and at Ethiopia’s Memorandum of Understanding (MoU) with Somaliland, which is internationally recognised as part of Somalia. Implementation of the MoU would represent a violation of Somali sovereignty and territorial integrity in an active intervention in internal Somali affairs. Since its 2006 invasion of Somalia, Ethiopia has been supporting one or another regional state in the Federal Republic to destabilise, weaken and fragment Somalia. 

That the government of Somalia does not exercise central authority over the entire national territory is a fundamental problem. This is abetted by the fact that there are external forces intervening, engaging and allying with one or another regional state within the federation. There are also reports of UAE support to the Rapid Support Force (RSF) in Sudan, which is essentially the former Janjaweed in Darfur, and for the Ethiopian government’s forays into Somaliland.  

How does all this geopolitical shifting in the region affect, uh, Eritrea and the international posture towards Eritrea? I mean, years ago, Eritrea was considered an outcast, a pariah regime by most of the Western powers and Western international media. Now, it seems that the power struggles in the region have played into the hands of Asmara, in the sense that more international powers are now courting the government of Isaias Afwerki.

Well, I think you're right. The regime remains very brutally repressive. It has not changed. But Eritrea's strategic location is a very significant asset, which entices major powers to seek some kind of presence or influence in Eritrea. Of course, the traditional conflict situation between Eritrea and Ethiopia is basically Ethiopia's making - the constant ambition of Ethiopia's successive rulers for expansion at the expense of the territorial integrity of Eritrea. I think it's also in the interest of both countries that Eritrea avails its port services and transit facilities to Ethiopia. But this should be done in accordance with international law. Ethiopia can have right of use but not right of ownership. What it is claiming is quite outlandish and truly unprecedented. 

The two countries, Ethiopia and Eritrea, have significant domestic challenges of governance, development and human security. They both produce large numbers of refugees and irregular migrants. They are both trapped in a state of impoverishment of their peoples. They sustain among the lowest standards of living in Africa. Both are fragile states with essentially dysfunctional institutions. So, they have really, uh, much more potent enemies than each other to focus their attention and resources on. They should address the problems of governance, development, and poverty, the problem of providing public health and essential services.  

Nowadays, it is difficult to speak of an effective international community. The world is divided, the UN Security Council is paralysed, and the post-WWII initially bi-polar and lately unipolar world order is giving way to a new multipolar global order. We live in a perilous period of transition during which, bluntly speaking, the rule of the jungle reigns, especially in the Middle East, as we've witnessed during the last year. As regards Eritrea, the West, especially the US, must look beyond hostility to the current authoritarian regime and play a constructive role in promoting regional peace, stability and security based on respect for the sovereignty and territorial integrity of the states, of each state in the region.

But it seems that, especially recently, I don't know if that's a wrong observation in your view, but it seems that the US have been very much reaching out to the government of President Afwerki, whereas Iran at the same time, Iran is reaching out and displaying common interest. There were rumors about the establishment of an Iranian naval base in Eritrea. I don't know if that news can be substantiated, but what about that? Eritrea between Iran and the United States? It's quite a peculiar position.

I have seen no evidence, and I believe there is no evidence of any foreign base in Eritrea today. There was a UAE base in Asseb that was used in the war in Yemen. But beyond that, I don't think there is a foreign base in Eritrea, in Eritrean waters or in the Eritrean islands of the Red Sea. I think these are speculative, false claims. 

But again, it looks like there is an interest for the US to improve its ties with the regime of President Afwerki. Isn’t it?

Yes, of course there is. Eritrea’s strategic location interests the major powers. It's also in the interest of Eritrea to have amicable relations with all states. And, you know, I'm a veteran of the war of independence or national liberation which was fought for an Eritrea that would pursue a non-aligned foreign policy, not belonging to any power bloc, not allowing any military or naval base on its territory. So given this historic stance, I think it's in the interest of Eritrea, the US, the West in general, and everyone concerned to build and sustain amicable relations. 

Do you see a meaningful role in the EU here.

Many of the factors of crisis in the region link economic to geopolitical challenges. For both, the EU is an important factor in the international community. The international community is represented by the UN. The EU is a very significant actor within the UN. The EU’s member states as individual members, one of which is a permanent member of the UN Security Council. The EU’s declared pursuit of a Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP) aspires to preserve peace and strengthen international security in accordance with the principles of the UN Charter. 

The pursuit of such an autonomous foreign and security policy can carve a significant role for the EU as a trusted regional and global actor. Really it can play quite a significant role given the collective weight - economic, diplomatic and military weight - of the EU. Acting, not only acting, but also perceived to be acting as a credible neutral actor without a hidden agenda, the EU can reshape its geopolitical narrative and emerge as the partner of choice towards a viable regional security architecture. What is needed is an EU that stands as a powerful pillar, a counterweight to the others in terms of supporting or defending the principles of the UN Charter.

Do you think that the Red Sea could be a model for a conference of security and cooperation as the one that we had in Europe to bring down the Cold War? Like a regional conflict de-escalation and conflict management mechanism? Of course, Israel is part of the Red Sea region too. But it seems that the setting in the Red Sea could be easier than in other parts of the Middle East since we have many conflicts but no on-going interstate wars going on there.

An excellent example to follow could be the Council of the Baltic Sea States (CBSS) established to promote regional cooperation among the littoral countries. Saudi Arabia undertook an initiative to establish the Red Sea Council of Arab and African Coastal States of the Red Sea and Gulf of Aden, but it has not really taken off. The potential is there, however. With a just resolution of the Palestinian question, Israel could also be integrated into such a Red Sea framework. All littoral states could be embraced in such a framework. There exist immense possibilities in various areas of potential cooperation, not only to secure safe maritime passage, shipping and trade, but also to collectively address environmental issues and development issues. So, there is a great potential. But again, for reasons that we have discussed, this potential remains unrealized. 

Saudi Arabia is fairly, I wouldn't say passive, but quiet if not timid in the Red Sea at the moment. No. Isn't it a bit counterintuitive? At the same time, they're having these huge development projects across the Red Sea coast. 

I think one of the mechanisms the Saudis have initiated, the Red Sea Council of Arab and African Coastal States of the Red Sea and Gulf of Aden, has convened twice in the past, if I remember right. But that does not seem to have gained traction to date.

How come?

Partly, this has to do with Saudi Arabia’s long involvement in the war in Yemen. They are in the process of rapprochement with Iran, and they also seem to be in the process of balancing their traditional relations with the US, China and Russia. It seems that they are in the process of rethinking their relations and their role in the region. Hopefully they would come up to proactively engage in support or in the promotion of peace, security, reconciliation, etc., but to date, I agree with you that they have been low key.

Most international peace and mediation initiatives have been conducted by Western or European UN special envoys. Given the complex relations and conflicts around the Red Sea, would it make sense to assign a ‘local’ with such a task? 

A deeper and wider understanding of the culture, traditions and the situation in the region and its history are very useful for resolving conflicts. Because there are similarities, from Eritrea, to Sudan and Yemen. You are right. It will make sense, and I believe it will be much more effective, because as long as one can act as an honest broker without taking sides, depending, of course, on one's experience, expertise and competence. I think somebody from the region with the requisite competence stands a better chance of success in resolving these seemingly intractable conflicts.

You were a key figure in the independence movement of Eritrea and fought at the forefront. What was the reason of your fallout with the Eritrean regime?

I decided to leave in 2005. During and after the war of independence, I was in the Central Committee, the leadership of the Front, as of its first congress in 1977. At a time, I served as editor-in-chief of the Front’s organ and the spokesperson for the Front, we portrayed an image of a progressive national liberation movement committed not only to the independence of Eritrea, but also to the freedom, emancipation, progress and prosperity of the Eritrean people. These were the ideals we espoused. Post-independence, what the government of Eritrea ended up doing was the exact opposite of what we fought for. Instead of democratic governance, we had malgovernance under authoritarian control. Instead of an accountable, transparent administrative structure, we have an opaque system with concentration of power in one place, the presidency.

We had fought and won against overwhelming odds and all Eritrean families paid a huge price for it. The policies and practices we implement as a government must vindicate the sacrifices that our people made. They should enjoy freedom. They should enjoy democracy. They should enjoy prosperity. The regime has decimated the Eritrean intellectual and entrepreneurial elite. Where are Eritrean entrepreneurs? They are in South Sudan, they are in Angola, in South Africa, they are in Kenya. They are in Uganda. Why? Because the space for them has been closed in Eritrea.

I have an additional question. It's on Russia's role. We see that Eritrea is loyally following Russia on every UN vote. How strong is Russian leverage over Asmara? And do you see sign of an expansion of Russian influence in the Red Sea? 

Eritrea’s aligning with Russia on every UN vote appears more of a symbolic solidarity of the sanctioned rather than an indication of strong Russian leverage over Asmera or an expansion of Russian influence in the Red Sea. You may recall that the US and the EU imposed sanctions on Eritrea in 2021 and 2022 for alleged involvement “in corruption, violence, and human rights abuses in northern Ethiopia”. The allegations were based on a false narrative that has since been debunked. As I reiterated at the time to a riled senior US State Department official in Washington, Eritrea voted with Russia to spite the US and the EU for imposing unjust unilateral sanctions on Eritrea. However, Eritrea’s national interest requires prudent diplomacy with a more balanced and nuanced stance in the context of the prevailing Great Power rivalry. 

Prof. Giorgis, thank you for this interview.