17 August 2026

Commentary: Abiy Ahmed’s Declaration of War on Eritrea

Amb. Andebrhan Welde Giorgis

         This commentary was first published on Er-Platform's website (www.eri-platform.org) on 30 November 2023 and republished on 11 March 2025. In view of the continuing threats by Ethiopian Prime Minister Abiy Ahmed and his senior political and military officials - including several former prisoners of war - advocating the acquisition of sovereign sea access through Eritrean territory, Er-Platform considers it timely and in the public interest to republish this commentary with minor edits.

Ethiopian Prime Minister Abiy Ahmed has asserted Ethiopia's claim to sovereign access to the Red Sea and repeatedly indicated that such access could, if necessary, be acquired by force. Although these statements were initially dismissed by many as political rhetoric intended to divert attention from Ethiopia's mounting domestic challenges and consolidate domestic support, subsequent military deployments in the Afar Region and along the southern border of Tigray, both adjacent to Eritrea, have heightened concerns that coercive diplomacy and brinkmanship could escalate into armed conflict. These concerns were reinforced when Abiy displayed a map at the African Union Summit in Addis Ababa in February 2025 depicting Ethiopia as encompassing substantial areas of Eritrea. These actions represent a direct challenge to Eritrea’s sovereignty and territorial integrity and have significantly increased the risk of renewed interstate conflict in the Horn of Africa.

In an address to the Ethiopian Parliament on 13 October 2023, Prime Minister Abiy Ahmed made claims that directly challenged the independence, sovereignty, and territorial integrity of Ethiopia's Red Sea littoral neighbours, particularly Eritrea. Given the implications of these claims for the prospects of peace between Eritrea and Ethiopia and for the wider security of the Horn of Africa, they warranted a timely and robust diplomatic response. Yet the Government of Eritrea had, immediately following his threat, failed to lodge a timely formal diplomatic démarche. This omission reflects the government's longstanding disregard for legal and diplomatic avenues in addressing major foreign policy challenges, thereby weakening its capacity to mobilise international support against threats to Eritrea's sovereignty.

Abiy Ahmed's inflammatory rhetoric has been echoed by senior officials and supporters of his regime through state and social media, fuelling public support for military action against Eritrea. Such aggression would violate the Charter of the United Nations, the Constitutive Act of the African Union, the 1982 United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea, the Algiers Agreements, and the 2018 Joint Declaration of Peace and Friendship between Eritrea and Ethiopia. Having already embroiled Ethiopia in multiple internal conflicts, any attempt to seize Eritrean territory would be a reckless escalation with potentially disastrous consequences. Defiance of international law and resort to force would threaten regional peace, further destabilise Ethiopia, and risk a wider conflict in the Horn of Africa.

Since October 2023, Prime Minister Abiy Ahmed and leaders of the Oromummaa-oriented Prosperity Party have repeatedly asserted Ethiopia's territorial claims against Eritrea in speeches to Parliament and meetings with business leaders, senior military officers, and party cadres. In his address to the Ethiopian Parliament, Abiy crossed a dangerous threshold by asserting that Ethiopia has a "natural right" to sovereign access to the Red Sea, that the Red Sea constitutes Ethiopia's "natural border," and that such access is an existential necessity grounded in history, geography, ethnicity, and economics. These assertions amount to a direct challenge to Eritrea's sovereignty and territorial integrity.

This revisionist narrative, rooted in a distorted reading of history and the enduring ambition to establish Ethiopian control over the Red Sea, has repeatedly fuelled conflict between the two countries. It underpinned successive Ethiopian attempts to subjugate Eritrea, culminating in the wars of 1961-1991 and 1998-2000, both of which ended in military defeat. While population size and military capability are important, Eritrea's experience over the past six decades demonstrates that the outcome of war ultimately depends on political resolve, national cohesion, and strategic resilience. Eritrea's victory in the War of Independence and its successful defence of its sovereignty after independence underscore the determination of its people to resist external aggression and preserve their sovereign statehood.

Prime Minister Abiy Ahmed's demand for sovereign ownership of a port, a transit corridor, and a naval base on the Red Sea poses a direct challenge to Eritrea's sovereignty and territorial integrity, with wider implications for regional stability. His claims raise fundamental historical, legal, and political questions. This commentary addresses these questions through the perspectives of history and international law.

Once again, Ethiopia's ruling elite has revived the longstanding ambition of a sovereign access to the Red Sea. Prime Minister Abiy Ahmed and his inner circle have advanced claims that extend beyond commercial access to encompass sovereign control of a port, a transit corridor, and a naval base on Eritrea's Red Sea coast. Such revisionist ambitions are neither new nor realistic. Similar attempts to impose Ethiopian domination over Eritrea have repeatedly ended in military failure at enormous human and economic cost to both countries.

By publicly advancing these claims, the Ethiopian government has placed itself on a dangerous collision course with Eritrea and heightened tensions across the Horn of Africa. Subsequent attempts to reinterpret the Prime Minister's statements have done little to dispel the concerns created by his repeated threats, public displays of military nationalism, the presentation of a map depicting expanded Ethiopian territory, and military deployments near the Eritrean border. Collectively, these actions have significantly increased the risk of interstate confrontation.

War would inflict devastating human, economic, and humanitarian costs on both Eritrea and Ethiopia while generating destabilising spillover effects throughout the Horn of Africa. It would also threaten the security of the strategically vital southern Red Sea maritime corridor and undermine regional and international peace and security. Preventing such an outcome requires respect for international law, the sovereignty and territorial integrity of all states, and a renewed commitment to peaceful diplomacy.

Abiy Ahmed has long signalled that the Ethiopian navy, re-established on Lake Tana, is ultimately intended for deployment on Eritrea's Red Sea coast. During the brief post-2018 rapprochement, President Isaias Afwerki had a unique opportunity to secure Ethiopia's formal recognition of the colonial treaty boundary as the permanent international frontier between the two states. Instead, he dismissed proposals to prioritise boundary demarcation, arguing that it was "not our priority now," thereby foregoing a critical opportunity to consolidate the legal foundation for durable peace.

A formal bilateral agreement reaffirming the EEBC-delimited boundary and committing the parties to its physical demarcation in due course could have reduced the scope for subsequent territorial claims and rebutted recurring allegations by elements within the Prosperity Party and Prosperity Party-aligned former Tigray People's Liberation Front (TPLF) leaders that Eritrea occupies Ethiopian territory. Instead, the absence of such an agreement has allowed competing territorial narratives to persist and fuel renewed tensions.

President Isaias's enthusiastic embrace of the post-2018 rapprochement - including symbolic gestures, assertions that Eritreans and Ethiopians are one people, and his endorsement of Abiy Ahmed's regional leadership - may have fostered unrealistic expectations regarding the future of bilateral relations. Such perceptions were reinforced when Abiy publicly declared that "what I and Esu (Isaias) will share is Asseb," amid reports that he proposed a territorial exchange, equity participation, or even a federation or confederation between Eritrea and Ethiopia. Whatever the seriousness of these proposals, the failure to secure a formal agreement reaffirming and physically demarcating the international boundary created a strategic vacuum that has since fuelled renewed territorial claims and heightened interstate tensions.

Whatever his aspirations, Prime Minister Abiy Ahmed appears to underestimate the political, legal, and strategic realities of the Horn of Africa. His proposals - including a territorial exchange, equity participation in Ethiopian Airlines or the Grand Ethiopian Renaissance Dam, and even federation or confederation between Eritrea and Ethiopia - are non-starters. For Eritrea, proposals for federation or confederation inevitably evoke the historical experience of the failed federation of 1952 and its unilateral dissolution in 1962, which precipitated three decades of war. Likewise, neither a territorial exchange nor equity shares can reasonably be regarded as equivalent to sovereign ownership of a coastline, its territorial sea, and its exclusive economic zone, together with the strategic and economic benefits they entail.

Instead of securing agreement through negotiation, Abiy has asserted that Ethiopia possesses a "natural right" to sovereign access to the Red Sea and has stated that force remains an option for acquiring a port and a naval base on Eritrea's coast. Such claims challenge the sovereignty and territorial integrity of Eritrea and are incompatible with the fundamental principles of international law governing the prohibition of the threat or use of force.

While maritime access is important for any landlocked state, sovereign ownership of another state's territory is neither an existential necessity nor a prerequisite for economic development. Ethiopia had successfully accessed the sea through a negotiated commercial arrangement with Eritrea for nearly two decades, demonstrating that viable alternatives exist. Attempts to attribute Ethiopia's economic challenges to the absence of sovereign sea access misdiagnose the country's underlying structural and governance problems. Any attempt to acquire territory by coercion or force would not only violate international law but also risk a costly interstate war, further destabilise the Horn of Africa, and inflict severe political, economic, and humanitarian consequences on Ethiopia itself.

Viewed against Ethiopia's domestic political dynamics and the broader regional security environment, Prime Minister Abiy Ahmed's agenda appears strategically misguided, highly risky, and ultimately unattainable. Rhetoric suggesting that it is now the turn of a particular ethnic constituency to lead Ethiopia and project regional dominance is especially dangerous in the context of the country's deeply ethnicised politics. Whether such ambitions gain political traction or translate into aggression against neighbouring states will ultimately depend on the Ethiopian people and their institutions. Nevertheless, Abiy's repeated references to Ethiopia's large and growing population carry an implicit message of coercive leverage directed at its smaller Red Sea neighbours - Eritrea, Djibouti, and Somalia.

History offers a clear warning against the pursuit of revisionist territorial ambitions. Successive Ethiopian governments sought, by force, to impose their will on Eritrea, yet none succeeded. Rather than advancing Ethiopia's national interests, those conflicts imposed immense human, economic, and political costs on both countries. The lesson is clear: durable security cannot be achieved through territorial expansion or the threat of force. Ethiopia's long-term interests lie instead in respecting the sovereignty and territorial integrity of its neighbours, resolving disputes through international law and diplomacy, and pursuing regional cooperation based on mutual benefit. Abandoning current territorial and maritime claims would better serve both Ethiopia's future and the prospects for lasting peace and stability in the Horn of Africa.

Prime Minister Abiy Ahmed's assertion that the Red Sea constitutes Ethiopia's natural border, supported by references to the Kingdom of Axum, Ras Alula, and Emperor Haile Selassie, reflects a fundamental misreading of the history of Axum, Eritrea, and the evolution of the modern states of the Horn of Africa. His claim that Eritrea naturally forms part of Ethiopia is historically and legally untenable. Were these claims confined to political rhetoric, they might have attracted little more than scholarly correction. However, their official endorsement and repeated dissemination through state institutions and pro-government media give them wider political and security significance. It is therefore necessary to examine the historical record and legal foundations of Eritrea's statehood and sovereignty to assess the validity of these claims.

The territory of present-day Eritrea, including the ancient port of Adulis, about 40 kilometres south of Massawa, formed the geographic and commercial heartland of the Kingdom of Axum. At the height of its power in the fourth and fifth centuries CE, the Axumite Kingdom extended across parts of present-day Eritrea, Ethiopia, Sudan, Egypt, Yemen, Saudi Arabia, Djibouti, and north-western Somalia. During the seventh century, however, Axum declined following the Arab conquest of Egypt, which disrupted its Red Sea trade and altered the regional balance of power. The resulting southward movement of Beja groups from eastern Egypt and northern Sudan reshaped the demographic and political landscape of the northern Horn of Africa.

The Beja incursions, the spread of Islam along the Red Sea coast, and the destruction of Adulis in 710 CE severed Axum's access to the Red Sea, disrupting the maritime trade on which its prosperity and power depended. Deprived of its principal port and coastline, the Christian Axumite kingdom retreated into the southern highlands and never regained control of the Red Sea littoral. Following Axum's collapse, it ceased to exist as a major regional power. From its decline until the late thirteenth century (1270), "the whole of Eritrea was still under the Beja Confederacy." 

Following a prolonged period of political fragmentation, Eritrea's Central Plateau became the core of Medre Bahri ("Land of the Sea"), an autonomous polity that flourished between the fifteenth and eighteenth centuries under the rule of the Bahri Negasi ("King of the Sea"). Despite recurrent warfare across the Mereb-Belesa-Muna watershed during Abyssinia's "Era of the Princes," the Central Plateau, Northern Highlands, Western Lowlands, and Coastal Plains that constitute present-day Eritrea remained politically distinct from Abyssinia. Travelling from Massawa to Lake Tana in 1770, the Scottish explorer James Bruce observed that "Medre Bahri and Abyssinia were distinctly separate political entities constantly at war with each other." 

During the late precolonial period, Medre Bahri entered another phase of political fragmentation because of internal divisions and external intervention. In the east, the Ottoman Empire, which had occupied Massawa and Hirgigo in 1557, retained control of the principal port and coastal plains until their transfer to Khedival Egypt in 1872. Egypt subsequently expanded into the Gash-Setit Basin, occupied the Bogos region, established a garrison at Keren, and advanced onto the Central Plateau. 

From the south, Abyssinia also invaded the Central Plateau and confronted Egyptian forces. It was during this campaign that Ras Alula, having secured the submission of Ras Welde Michael Solomon, established his headquarters at Asmera. Meanwhile, Italy acquired a foothold at the Bay of Asseb in 1869 and, with British support aimed at forestalling French expansion from Djibouti, progressively occupied the territory that became the Colony of Eritrea, formally proclaimed in 1890 as Italy's first African colony. 

The historical record demonstrates that Medre Bahri existed for centuries as a distinct political entity, autonomous from and frequently in conflict with successive Abyssinian kingdoms. Although several kingdoms rose and fell in Abyssinia during the eleven centuries between the decline of Axum and the advent of European colonial rule, none can credibly claim uninterrupted succession to the Kingdom of Axum or historical sovereignty over Eritrea's Red Sea coast. Nor did any Abyssinian ruler - including Ras Alula - establish enduring control over the whole of Medre Bahri or set foot on the Eritrean coast between the decline of Axum and the federation of Eritrea with Ethiopia in 1952. 

In short, the territory of present-day Eritrea remained politically fragmented between the mid-sixteenth and late nineteenth centuries. During this period, parts of Medre Bahri came under Ottoman (1557-1872), Egyptian (1872-1885), Italian (1869-1890), and Abyssinian (1876-1887) occupation. The establishment of the Italian Colony of Eritrea in 1890, however, brought the territory under a single colonial administration, marking the first territorial integration of modern Eritrea. Eritrea subsequently experienced Italian colonial rule (1890-1941), British Military Administration (1941-1952), federation with Ethiopia (1952-1962), Ethiopian annexation (1962-1991), and, following a thirty-year war of independence, the establishment of its sovereign statehood in 1991.

At the same time, Abyssinia occupied the paradoxical position of both victim and beneficiary of the European scramble for Africa. Although it decisively defeated Italy at the Battle of Adwa in 1896 - an epic victory - it simultaneously expanded through a series of wars that, aided by European arms and rivalries, brought vast non-Abyssinian territories under imperial rule. Access to modern firearms, initially from Italy and later from France, enabled Menelik II to consolidate power, establish the Ethiopian Empire, and conquer territories inhabited by the Afar, Anuak, Beni Shangul, Borana, Gambela, Gurage, Konso, Oromo, Sidama, Somali, Welayta, and other peoples. By 1910, these conquests had largely produced the geopolitical configuration of modern Ethiopia, while Eritrea had already existed for two decades as a distinct colonial territory.

Neither Eritrea nor Ethiopia existed in their present geopolitical form before the colonial era. Like most modern African states, both emerged from the territorial partition of Africa by the European colonial powers. Their contemporary territorial configurations were shaped by colonial rule, while their international boundary was defined by the colonial treaties concluded between Italy and Ethiopia.

Eritrea and Ethiopia share an approximately 1,000-kilometre international boundary defined by three colonial treaties. The 1900 Treaty between Italy and Ethiopia delimited the Central Sector of the boundary. The 1902 Treaty between Italy, Ethiopia, and Great Britain amended the Western Sector while leaving the Central Sector unchanged. The 1908 Treaty between Italy and Ethiopia delimited the Eastern Sector.

The boundary established by these treaties became the internationally recognised frontier between Eritrea and Ethiopia. Upon attaining independence, Eritrea succeeded to this colonial treaty boundary in accordance with the principle of state succession. Eritrea's admission to the United Nations and recognition by the international community affirmed its sovereignty within those boundaries, consistent with treaty law, the customary international law principle of uti possidetis juris, and the Constitutive Act of the African Union. Accordingly, the Eritrea-Ethiopia boundary is a legally established international frontier, not a matter of historical revisionism or political negotiation.

Italy transformed a previously fragmented territory into a single colonial entity under a unified central administration. It developed modern urban centres, transport and communications networks, and industrial infrastructure to serve a settler colony, while introducing new economic and social relations. Simultaneously, colonial exploitation and institutionalised racial discrimination fostered a growing sense of common identity and stimulated the emergence of Eritrean nationalism. Shared experience under colonial rule gradually forged a distinct Eritrean national identity rooted in a common history, culture, and collective consciousness.

The continuation of colonial rule under the British Military Administration further strengthened Eritrean aspirations for self-determination. The interplay between external domination and sustained popular resistance nurtured an overarching national identity that transcended ethnic, linguistic, religious, and regional divisions. More than a century of political resistance and armed struggle consolidated Eritrean nationalism, defeated Ethiopian annexation, and culminated in the founding of Eritrea's independence and sovereign statehood. With Eritrea's internationally recognised independence, the territorial and boundary question was settled in accordance with the colonial treaties and the principle of uti possidetis juris.

The legitimacy of Eritrea's self-determination, sovereign statehood, and territorial integrity is grounded in history and anchored in international law. Lasting peace between Eritrea and Ethiopia requires Ethiopia to respect Eritrea's independence, sovereignty, and territorial integrity, as well as the inviolability of the colonial treaty boundary. Such mutual respect is the indispensable foundation for peaceful coexistence, constructive bilateral relations, and the shared prosperity of the peoples of both countries.

The Eritrean people made immense sacrifices to secure their independence. Sovereign Eritrea is the product of the struggle, sacrifice, and resilience of successive generations and is not open to revision. Despite prolonged domestic challenges, Eritreans have consistently demonstrated their determination and capacity to defend their country's independence, sovereignty, and territorial integrity. They should not be compelled to do so again. Beyond safeguarding independence, the Eritrean people aspire to justice, freedom, prosperity, and governance founded on the rule of law.

The governments of present-day Eritrea and Ethiopia did not create their common boundary; both inherited it under the colonial treaties. Ethiopia should therefore unequivocally reaffirm the principle of uti possidetis juris and recognise the Eritrea-Ethiopia boundary as defined by those treaties and largely confirmed by the Eritrea-Ethiopia Boundary Commission (EEBC). The attempt by Ethiopia's previous government to redraw the boundary in 1997, and the conflict that followed, underscore the dangers of revisionist territorial claims.

The full implementation of the Algiers Agreements and the physical demarcation of the boundary in accordance with the EEBC's Demarcation Directions, with the technical support of the United Nations Cartographic Unit, remain essential for reducing the risk of renewed conflict and establishing a durable peace. Physical demarcation would reaffirm the finality of the legal settlement and remove a persistent source of interstate tension.

Experience since Eritrea's federation with Ethiopia demonstrates that stable bilateral relations require an Ethiopian government committed to peaceful coexistence, respect for international law, and good-neighbourly relations. While Ethiopia's political system is for its people alone to determine, the emergence of inclusive and accountable governance would strengthen the prospects for lasting peace. The development of autonomous civil society in both countries could further support dialogue, reconciliation, and cross-border cooperation.

Breaking the cycle of confrontation and zero-sum politics requires political courage, reconciliation, and a shared commitment to peaceful coexistence. With mutual respect for sovereignty, adherence to international law, and effective cooperation, Eritrea and Ethiopia can normalise their relations, unlock the complementarity of their economies, and contribute to peace, stability, and regional integration in the Horn of Africa.

Prime Minister Abiy Ahmed has asserted Ethiopia's claim to sovereign ownership of access to the Red Sea and pledged to pursue it for generations to come. This claim is neither new nor legally sustainable. It echoes the longstanding revisionist narrative advanced by sections of the Ethiopian political elite that rejects the legitimacy of Eritrea's sovereign statehood and promotes Ethiopia’s expansionist visions. By claiming a right of ownership rather than a right of use and transit, the Ethiopian government directly challenges the independence, sovereignty, and territorial integrity of Eritrea and poses a serious threat to regional peace and stability.

Ethiopia's need for legal access to the sea is both legitimate and essential for its foreign trade. However, international law distinguishes between a right of access and a right of territorial ownership. The terms of maritime access and transit must be negotiated with adjacent coastal states in accordance with international law. Article 125 of the 1982 United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS) recognises the right of landlocked states to access the sea and enjoy freedom of transit by agreement with transit states, while affirming the sovereignty of those states over their territory and their authority to safeguard their legitimate interests. 

State practice confirms this legal framework. Many landlocked states - including Ethiopia - secure maritime access through bilateral agreements rather than territorial claims. Even major maritime trading nations routinely rely on the ports of neighbouring states where this is commercially advantageous. Following Eritrea's independence, Ethiopia itself concluded a Protocol Agreement granting concessionary access and freedom of transit through the ports of Massawa and Asseb, while today it relies primarily on Djibouti under negotiated arrangements.

It should also be recalled that Ethiopia ceased using Eritrea's ports after declaring war in 1998, bombing the ports of Massawa and Asseb, and discouraging international shipping from calling at them. After the war, Prime Minister Meles Zenawi publicly declared that Ethiopia would no longer use Eritrean ports, choosing instead to forego their economic advantages. The issue, therefore, has never been the legal availability of port access but the political choices made by successive Ethiopian governments.

Rather than pursuing legally untenable claims to sovereign ownership, Ethiopia should abandon the language of territorial entitlement and negotiate, in good faith, mutually beneficial arrangements for port access and transit consistent with UNCLOS and the principles of sovereign equality and good-neighbourly relations. Eritrea's Red Sea ports possess considerable potential to serve not only Eritrea and Ethiopia but also the wider region and the world at large. With political wisdom, mutual trust, and respect for international law, they could become important gateways for trade, investment, and regional economic integration, transforming a source of conflict into an opportunity for shared prosperity.

Compensation and reparations are recognised forms of corrective justice for internationally wrongful acts, including aggression, colonial domination, unlawful occupation, and other serious violations of international law.

The Eritrean people endured successive periods of colonial rule under Italy and Great Britain, followed by Ethiopia's unilateral dissolution of the federal arrangement, annexation of Eritrea, and a thirty-year war of domination. During these successive periods, Eritrea experienced political subjugation, economic exploitation, widespread destruction of infrastructure and productive assets, and extensive human loss and suffering.

Against this historical background, Eritrea has a legitimate basis to pursue claims for compensation and reparations arising from internationally wrongful acts committed during successive periods of colonial rule and armed conflict. Pursuing such claims through appropriate legal and diplomatic channels could contribute to historical accountability, acknowledge the immense human and material losses suffered by the Eritrean people, and reinforce the principle that aggression and colonial domination carry legal consequences. More broadly, accountability for past wrongs may help deter future violations of international law and contribute to the foundations of a just and durable peace between Eritrea and Ethiopia.

Joseph Goebbels famously argued that a sufficiently large falsehood, repeated often enough, could create the illusion of truth. A similar narrative has long circulated among certain elements of the Ethiopian and Tigrayan political elite, claiming that, during the 1998-2000 Eritrea-Ethiopia war, Prime Minister Meles Zenawi personally overruled the Ethiopian military's decision to capture Asmara and Asseb. This narrative has served to rationalise Ethiopia's failure to achieve its principal war objective of reoccupying Eritrea.

The military record tells a different story. The Eritrean Defence Forces (EDF) repelled successive large-scale Ethiopian offensives on the Alitena-Mereb Front (Aiga, Alitena, Zalambessa, and Tserona), the Mereb-Setit Front (Badme and Geza Gerehlase), and the Bure Front. Although Ethiopia achieved a breakthrough at Badme in February 1999, the EDF subsequently halted and defeated Ethiopia's major offensives directed towards Asmara at Igri Mekhel, Adi Begi'o, and Zalambessa, and towards Asseb at Bure. Ethiopia committed successive divisions to these operations but failed to attain its strategic objectives. According to accounts in the public domain, the war ended after the Ethiopian commanders on the three fronts separately informed Prime Minister Meles Zenawi that their forces had been exhausted and were no longer capable of sustaining further offensive operations.  

More recently, a new revisionist narrative has emerged claiming that Asseb has never been part of Eritrea and has always belonged to Ethiopia. The historical record does not support this assertion. Italy acquired Asseb in 1869, before the formation of the modern Ethiopian state under Menelik II. By the time Menelik completed the incorporation of many non-Abyssinian territories into the Ethiopian Empire between 1889 and 1910, Eritrea had already been established as a distinct colonial territory in 1890.

Current rhetoric advocating the seizure of Asseb by force is therefore not only historically revisionist but also legally untenable. Any attempt to acquire Eritrean territory through the threat or use of force would constitute aggression prohibited by the Charter of the United Nations and other principles of international law. Such a conflict would not simply be a bilateral dispute but an unlawful act of aggression with serious consequences for regional peace and security. The overriding priority should therefore be to resolve outstanding issues through diplomacy, respect for international law, and full recognition of the sovereignty and territorial integrity of all states in the Horn of Africa.

War has long been described as the continuation of politics by other means, while diplomacy serves as the continuation of political and strategic competition by peaceful means. Politics, war, and diplomacy are therefore inseparable instruments of statecraft. Proactively employed, diplomacy can prevent conflict, shape the strategic environment, advance national interests, and reduce the likelihood of war.

An essential instrument of proactive diplomacy is the timely lodging of a démarche - a formal diplomatic communication conveying a government's official position to another state or an international organisation. Governments use démarches to protest hostile actions, defend national interests, influence the conduct of other states, and establish an official diplomatic record. Timely démarches can clarify legal positions, mobilise international support, and strengthen a state's position should disputes escalate.

Effective national security requires more than capable armed forces and credible deterrence. It also depends on proactive diplomacy, strategic partnerships, and sustained international engagement. Diplomatic action can prevent, contain, or manage crises and help shape international perceptions regarding the origins and legality of a dispute. Eritrea's experience illustrates the costs of diplomatic inaction. The failure to lodge timely démarches during the Ad Murug incident in 1997 and the Badme crisis in 1998 contributed to the adoption of 6 May 1998 as the status quo ante, to Eritrea's diplomatic disadvantage.

Drawing on these lessons, the Government of Eritrea should have lodged timely formal démarches with the Government of Ethiopia, the Secretary-General of the United Nations, the UN Security Council, the African Union, the European Union, and other key international actors following Prime Minister Abiy Ahmed's statement to the Ethiopian Parliament on 13 October 2023 and his subsequent display of a map incorporating Eritrean territory at the African Union Summit in Addis Ababa on 15 February 2025. Such démarches would have formally placed Eritrea's legal position on record, rejected any threat to its sovereignty and territorial integrity, and reinforced the international prohibition on the threat or use of force.

Silence in the face of repeated official threats to a state's sovereignty and territorial integrity carries diplomatic costs. Failure to respond timely through established diplomatic channels weakens a state's ability to shape international opinion, defend its legal position, and mobilise external support, while placing a greater burden on military deterrence. Proactive diplomacy, exercised alongside credible national defence, remains an indispensable instrument for safeguarding national security interests and preserving peace.

Prime Minister Abiy Ahmed's declared intention to invade Eritrea and seize the port of Asseb by force constitutes a direct threat to the independence, sovereignty, and territorial integrity of the State of Eritrea, as well as to the security of its people. Should Ethiopia resort to aggression, Eritreans have a duty to oppose and resist any violation of their country's sovereignty. Support for or collaboration with such aggression would be a betrayal of Eritrea's national interest and its inherent right to self-defence under international law.

At the same time, the Eritrean people - like all peoples - are entitled to human security, dignity, freedom, and prosperity. They have the inalienable right to choose their government, live under the rule of law, enjoy fundamental rights and freedoms, and build their future in their own country rather than in exile as refugees or irregular migrants.

Safeguarding national sovereignty and advancing democratic governance are complementary, not competing, objectives. Those committed to Eritrea's national interest should promote constitutional government, the protection of fundamental rights, and sound stewardship of the country's human and natural resources. Opening political and economic space, strengthening the rule of law, and implementing prudent economic policies would encourage investment, create employment, and lay the foundations for sustainable and inclusive development.

While working towards a peaceful transition to constitutional and democratic governance, Eritreans at home and abroad must remain committed to defending the country's independence, sovereignty, and territorial integrity. In a volatile regional environment, Eritrea requires credible deterrence, a professional and well-equipped defence force under unified command, and a skilled, growing population capable of supporting both national development and national security. This, in turn, requires the professionalisation of the Eritrean Defence Forces and the implementation of national service in accordance with Proclamation No. 82/1995. 

The Eritrean people have long found themselves caught between domestic repression and the threat of external aggression. Safeguarding Eritrea's long-term national interests requires addressing both. Eritreans committed to the national interest should defend the country's sovereign independence and territorial integrity while advocating constitutional governance, the institution of popular sovereignty, and the protection of fundamental rights and freedoms. Achieving these objectives requires broad cooperation among pro-democracy forces at home and in the diaspora through an inclusive Eritrean Sovereignty Bloc capable of strengthening the people’s agency, advancing democratic transition, and countering both authoritarian rule and external aggression.

The alternative to a negotiated settlement grounded in international law is renewed war, with its inevitable human, economic, and regional costs. Ethiopia should therefore abandon claims to sovereign ownership of territory on the Red Sea, withdraw maps and official statements implying territorial revisionism, and refrain from threats or preparations for the use of force. Instead, it should engage in good-faith negotiations with Eritrea to establish mutually beneficial arrangements for maritime access and freedom of transit consistent with the 1982 United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea, while fully respecting Eritrea's sovereignty, territorial integrity, and legitimate security interests.